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Abstract
Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space
for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction,
which does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice.
Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price
Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders’ payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We
show that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different than that of
the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem. First, unlike the first-price variant, for which
small constant-factor approximations are known, it is NP-hard to approximate the Second-Price
Ad Auctions problem to any non-trivial factor. Second, this discrepancy extends even to the 0-1
special case that we call the Second-Price Matching problem (2PM). In particular, offline 2PM
is APX-hard, and for online 2PM there is no deterministic algorithm achieving a non-trivial
competitive ratio and no randomized algorithm achieving a competitive ratio better than 2.
This stands in contrast to the results for the analogous special case in the first-price model,
the standard bipartite matching problem, which is solvable in polynomial time and which has
deterministic and randomized online algorithms achieving better competitive ratios. On the
positive side, we provide a 2-approximation for offline 2PM and a 5.083-competitive randomized
algorithm for online 2PM. The latter result makes use of a new generalization of a classic result
on the performance of the “Ranking” algorithm for online bipartite matching.
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1 Introduction
The rising economic importance of online sponsored search advertising has led to a great deal of
research focused on developing its theoretical underpinnings. (See, e.g., [LPSV07] for a survey).
Since search engines such as Google, Yahoo! and Bing depend on sponsored search for a significant
fraction of their revenue, a key problem is how to optimally allocate ads to keywords (user searches)
so as to maximize search engine revenue [AMT07, AM04, ABK+08, BJN07, CG08, DH09, GMNS08,
GM08, MNS07, MSVV07, Sri08]. Most of the research on the dynamic version of this problem
assumes that once the participants in each keyword auction are determined, the pricing is done via
a first-price auction; in other words, bidders pay what they bid. This does not realistically model
the standard mechanism used by search engines, called the Generalized Second Price mechanism
(GSP) [EOS07, Var07].
In an attempt to model reality more closely, we study the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem,
which is the analogue of the above allocation problem when bidders’ payments are determined
by the GSP mechanism. As in other work [ABK+08, BJN07, CG08, MSVV07, Sri08], we make
the simplifying assumption that there is only one slot for each keyword. In this case, the GSP
mechanism for a given keyword auction reduces to a second-price auction – given the participants
in the auction, it allocates the advertisement slot to the highest bidder, charging that bidder the
bid of the second-highest bidder.1
In the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, there is a set of keywords U and a set of bidders
V , where each bidder v ∈ V has a known daily budget Bv and a non-negative bid bu,v for every
keyword u ∈ U . The keywords are ordered by their arrival time, and as each keyword u arrives,
the algorithm (i.e., the search engine) must choose a bidder to allocate it to. The search engine
is not required to choose the highest-bidding bidder; in order to optimize the allocation of bidders
to keywords, search engines typically use a “throttling” algorithm that chooses which bidders to
select to participate in an auction for a given keyword [GMNS08].2
In the previously-studied first-price version of the problem, allocating a keyword to a bidder
meant choosing a single bidder v and allocating u to v at a price of bu,v. In the Second-Price
Ad Auctions problem, two bidders are selected instead of one. Of these two bidders, the bidder
with the higher bid (where bids are always reduced to the minimum of the actual bid and bidders’
remaining budgets) is allocated that keyword’s advertisement slot at the price of the other bid. (In
the GSP mechanism for k slots, k + 1 bidders are selected, and each of the top k bidders pays the
bid of the next-highest bidder.)
This process results in an allocation and pricing of the advertisement slots associated with each
of the keywords. The goal is to select the bidders participating in each auction to maximize the
total profit extracted by the algorithm. For an example instance of this problem, see Figure 1.
1.1 Our Results
We begin by considering the offline version of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which the
algorithm knows all of the original bids of the bidders (Section 3). Our main result here is that it is
NP-hard to approximate the optimal solution to this problem to within a factor better than Ω(m),
1 This simplication, among others (see [LPSV07]), leaves room to improve the accuracy of our model. However,
the hardness results clearly hold for the multi-slot case as well.
2 In this paper, we assume the search engine is optimizing over revenue although it is certainly conceivable that
a search engine would consider other objectives.
1
where m is the number of keywords, even when the bids are small compared to budgets. This
strong inapproximability result is matched by the trivial algorithm that selects the single keyword
with the highest second-best bidder and allocates only that keyword to its top two bidders. It
stands in sharp contrast to the standard First-Price Ad Auctions problem, for which there is a
4/3-approximation to the offline problem [CG08, Sri08] and an e/(e− 1)-competitive algorithm to
the online problem when bids are small compared to budgets [BJN07, MSVV07].
We then turn our attention to a theoretically appealing special case that we call Second-Price
Matching. In this version of the problem, all bids are either 0 or 1 and all budgets are 1. This can
be thought of as a variant on maximum bipartite matching in which the input is a bipartite graph
G = (U ∪V,E), and the vertices in U must be matched, in order, to the vertices in V such that the
profit of matching u ∈ U to v ∈ V is 1 if and only if there is at least one additional vertex v′ ∈ V
that is a neighbor of u and is unmatched at that time. One can justify the second-price version of
the problem by observing that when we sell an item, we can only charge the full value of the item
when there is more than one interested buyer.3
Recall that the first-price analogue to the Second-Price Matching problem, the maximum bipar-
tite matching problem, can be solved optimally in polynomial time. The online version has a trivial
2-competitive deterministic greedy algorithm and an e/(e − 1)-competitive randomized algorithm
due to Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani [KVV90], both of which are best possible.
In contrast, we show that the Second-Price Matching problem is APX-hard (Section 4.1). We
also give a 2-approximation algorithm for the offline problem (Section 4.2). We then turn to
the online version of the problem. Here, we show that no deterministic online algorithm can
get a competitive ratio better than m, where m is the number of keywords in the instance, and
that no randomized online algorithm can get a competitive ratio better than 2 (Section 5.1). On
the other hand, we present a randomized online algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of
2
√
e/(
√
e − 1) ≈ 5.08 (Section 5.2). To obtain this competitive ratio, we prove a generalization
3 A slightly more amusing motivation is to imagine that the two sets of nodes represent boys and girls and the
edges represent mutual interest, but a girl is only interested in a boy if another girl is also actively interested in that
boy.
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Figure 1: An example of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem: the nodes in U are keywords and the
nodes in V are bidders. The number immediately to the right of each bidder represents its remaining budget,
and the number next to each edge connecting a bidder to a keyword represents the bid of that bidder for
that keyword. (a) shows the situation when the first keyword arrives. For this keyword, the search engine
selects the first bidder, whose bid is 4, and the second bidder, whose bid is 3. The keyword is allocated to
the first bidder at a price of 3, thereby reducing that bidder’s budget by 3. (b) shows the situation when
the second keyword arrives. The bid of the first bidder for that keyword is adjusted to the minimum of
its original bid, 6, and its remaining budget, 3. Then the first and the third bidders are selected, and the
keyword is allocated to the third bidder at a price of 3.
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Offline Online
Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound
1PAA 4/3 [CG08,
Sri08]
16/15 [CG08] e/(e−1)∗ [BJN07, MSVV07]
or 2 [LLN06]
e/(e−1) [MSVV07,
KVV90]
2PAA O(m) Ω(m) - -
Matching poly-time alg. e/(e− 1) [KVV90, GM08] e/(e− 1) [KVV90]
2PM 2 364/363 2
√
e/(
√
e− 1) ≈ 5.083 2
Table 1: A summary of the results in this paper, compared to known results for the first-price case. The
upper bound of e/(e−1) for Online 1PAA only holds when when the bids are small compared to the budgets.
of the result due to Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani [KVV90] and Goel and Mehta [GM08] that the
Ranking algorithm for online bipartite matching achieves a competitive ratio of e/(e− 1).
1.2 Related Work
As discussed above, the related First-Price Ad Auctions problem4 has received a fair amount of
attention. Mehta et al. [MSVV07] present an algorithm for the online version that achieves an
optimal competitive ratio of e/(e − 1) for the case when the bids are much smaller than the
budgets, a result also proved by Buchbinder et al. [BJN07]. Under similar assumptions, Devanur
and Hayes show that when the keywords arrive according to a random permutation, a (1 − ε)-
approximation is possible [DH09]. When there is no restriction on the values of the bids relative to
the budgets, the best known competitive ratio is 2 [LLN06]. For the offline version of the problem,
a sequence of papers [LLN06, AM04, FV06, ABK+08, Sri08, CG08] culminating in a paper by
Chakrabarty and Goel, and independently, a paper by Srinivasan, show that the offline problem
can be approximated to within a factor of 4/3 and that there is no polynomial time approximation
algorithm that achieves a ratio better than 16/15 unless P = NP [CG08].
The most closely related work to ours is the paper of Goel, Mahdian, Nazerzadeh and Saberi
[GMNS08], which builds on the work of Abrams, Medelvitch, and Tomlin [AMT07]. Goel et al. look
at the online allocation problem when the search engine is committed to charging under the GSP
scheme, with multiple slots per keyword. They study two models, the “strict” and “non-strict”
models, both of which differ from our model even for the one slot case by allowing bidders to keep
bidding their orginal bid, even when their budget falls below this amount. Thus, in these models,
although bidders are not charged more than their remaining budget when allocated a keyword, a
bidder with a negligible amount of remaining budget can keep his bids high indefinitely, and as long
as this bidder is never allocated another slot, this high bid can determine the prices other bidders
pay on many keywords. Under the assumption that bids are small compared to budgets, Goel et al.
build on the linear programming formulation of Abrams et al. to present an e/(e− 1)-competitive
algorithm for the non-strict model and a 3-competitive algorithm for the strict model.
The significant, qualitative difference between these positive results and the strong hardness
we prove for our model suggests that these aspects of the problem formulation are important. We
4This problem has also been called the Adwords problem [DH09, MSVV07] and the Maximum Budgeted Allocation
problem [ABK+08, CG08, Sri08]. It is an important special case of SMW [DS06, FV06, KLMM05, LLN06, MSV08,
Von08], the problem of maximizing utility in a combinatorial auction in which the utility functions are submodular,
and is also related to the Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP) [CK00, FV06, FGMS06, ST93].
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feel that our model, in which bidders are not allowed to bid more than their remaining budget, is
more natural because it seems inherently unfair that a bidder with negligible or no budget should
be able to indefinitely set high prices for other bidders.
2 Model and Notation
We define the Second-Price Ad Auctions (2PAA) problem formally as follows. The input is a set
of ordered keywords U and bidders V . Each bidder v ∈ V has a budget Bv and a nonnegative bid
bu,v for every keyword u ∈ U . We assume that all of bidder v’s bids bu,v are less than or equal to
Bv.
Let Bv(t) be the remaining budget of bidder v immediately after the t-th keyword is processed
(so Bv(0) = Bv for all v), and let bu,v(t) = min(bu,v, Bv(t)). (Both quantities are defined induc-
tively.) A solution (or second-price matching) to 2PAA chooses for the t-th keyword u a pair of
bidders v1 and v2 such that bu,v1(t − 1) ≥ bu,v2(t − 1), allocates the slot for keyword u to bidder
v1 and charges bidder v1 a price of p(t) = bu,v2(t − 1), the bid of v2. (We say that v1 acts as the
first-price bidder for u and v2 acts as the second-price bidder for u.) The budget of v1 is then
reduced by p(t), so Bv1(t) = Bv1(t− 1)− p(t). For all other bidders v 6= v1, Bv(t) = Bv(t− 1). The
final value of the solution is
∑
t p(t), and the goal is to find a solution of maximum value.
In the offline version of the problem, all of the bids are known to the algorithm beforehand,
whereas in the online version of the problem, keyword u and the bids bu,v for each v ∈ V are
revealed only when keyword u arrives, at which point the algorithm must irrevocably map u to a
pair of bidders without knowing the bids for the keywords that will arrive later.
The special case referred to as Second-Price Matching (2PM) is where bu,v is either 0 or 1 for
all (u, v) pairs and Bv = 1 for all v. We will think of this as the variant on maximum bipartite
matching (with input G = (U ∪ V,E)) described in Section 1.1. Note that in 2PM, a keyword
can only be allocated for profit if its degree is at least two. Therefore, we assume without loss of
generality that for all inputs of 2PM, the degree of every keyword is at least two.
For an input to 2PAA, let Rmin = minu,v Bv/bu,v, and let m = |U | be the number of keywords.
3 Hardness of Approximation of 2PAA
In this section, we present our main hardness result for the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem.
For a constant c ≥ 1, let 2PAA(c) be the version of 2PAA in which we are promised that Rmin ≥ c.
Theorem 1. Let c ≥ 1 be a constant integer. For any constant c′ > c, it is NP-hard to approximate
2PAA(c) to a factor of m/c′.
Hence, even when the bids are guaranteed to be smaller than the budget by a large constant factor,
it is NP-hard to approximate 2PAA to a factor better than Ω(m). After proving this result, we
show in Theorem 2 that this hardness is matched by a trivial algorithm.
Proof. Fix a constant c′ > c, and let n0 be the smallest integer such that for all n ≥ n0,
c′ · c(n
5 + n+ 2)
cn2 + n+ 2
≥ c(n3 + cn2 + n+ 2) (1)
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and
n/2 + 1
2
≥ c . (2)
Note that since n0 depends only on c′, it is a constant.
We reduce from PARTITION, in which the input is a set of n ≥ n0 items, and the weight of
the i-th item is given by wi. If W =
∑n
i=1wi, then the question is whether there is a partition of
the items into two subsets of size n/2 such that the sum of the wi’s in each subset is W/2. It is
known that this problem (even when the subsets must both have size n/2) is NP-hard [GJ79].
Given an instance of PARTITION, we create an instance of 2PAA(c) as follows. (This reduction
is illustrated in Figure 2.)
• First, create n+ 2 keywords c1, . . . , cn, e1, e2. Second, create an additional set
G =
{
gi,k : 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ c
}
of cn2 keywords. The keywords arrive in the order
c1, . . . , cn, e1, e2, g1,1, . . . , g1,c, . . . . . . , gn2,1, . . . , gn2,c .
• Create n2+4 bidders a, d1, d2, f, h1, . . . , hn2 . Set the budgets of a, d1, and d2 to cW (1+n/2).
Set the budget of f to cW (n3 + 1). For 1 ≤ i ≤ n2, set the budget of hi to cWn3.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, bidders a, d1, and d2 bid c(wi +W ) on keyword ci.
• For j ∈ {1, 2}, bidder dj bids cW on keyword ej . Bidder f bids cW/2 on both e1 and e2.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ c, keyword gi,k receives a bid of W (n3 + 1) from bidder f and a
bid of Wn3 from bidder hi.
This reduction can clearly be performed in polynomial time. Furthermore, it can easily be checked
that (2) implies that no bidder bids more than 1/c of its budget on any keyword.
We first show that if the PARTITION instance is a “yes” instance, then there exists a feasible
solution to the 2PAA(c) instance of value at least cW (n5 + n + 2). Let S ⊆ [n] be such that
|S| = n/2 and ∑i∈S wi = ∑i∈S wi = W/2. We construct a solution to the 2PAA(c) instance as
follows. For every i ∈ S, allocate ci to d1, and for every i ∈ S, allocate ci to d2. For each of these
allocations, choose a as the second-price bidder. This will reduce the budget of d1 and d2 to exactly
cW/2, and hence the bids from d1 to e1 and from d2 to e2 will both be reduced to cW/2. Allocate
e1 to f choosing d1 as the second-price bidder, and allocate e2 to f choosing d2 as the second-price
bidder. This will reduce the budget of f to cWn3. The profit from the solution constructed so far
is cW (n+ 2). Now allocate g1,1, g1,2, . . . , g1,c−1 to f , choosing h1 as the second-price bidder. This
will reduce the budget of f to Wn3. Hence, it can act as the second-price bidder for each of the
remaining keywords in G. Allocate g1,c to h1, choosing f as the second-price bidder, and then, for
2 ≤ i ≤ n2 and 1 ≤ k ≤ c, allocate gi,k to hi, choosing f as the second-price bidder. The profit
obtained for each keyword in G in this assignment is Wn3. Since |G| = cn2, the total profit of the
solution constructed is cW (n+ 2) + cWn5 = cW (n5 + n+ 2).
We now show that if there is a second-price matching in the 2PAA(c) instance of value at least
cW (n3 + cn2 + n+ 2), then there must be a partition of w1, . . . , wn. In such a matching, at most
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Figure 2: The 2PAA(c) instance of the reduction. Each bidder’s budget is shown above its node, and the
bids of bidders for keywords is shown near the corresponding edge.
cW (n+ 2) units of profit can be obtained from keywords c1, . . . , cn, e1, e2, since the initial second-
highest bids on those keywords sum to cW (n+ 2). Hence, at least cW (n3 + cn2) profit must come
from the keywords in G.
Suppose that the budget of f is greater than cWn3 after keywords e1 and e2 are allocated. Note
that at least c of the keywords in G must be allocated to reach a profit of cW (n3 + cn2) on these
keywords. Consider what happens after the first c of the keywords in G are assigned. For each
of these keywords, f must have been the first-price bidder, so its budget is reduced to an amount
greater than 0 and less than or equal to cW . Hence, for each keyword in G allocated henceforth,
f is the second-price bidder, and the profit is at most cW . Since there are at most c(n2 − 1)
more keywords in G, the total profit from the keywords in G is at most cWn3 + c2W (n2 − 1),
which contradicts the fact that at least cW (n3 + cn2) units of profit must come from G. Hence, we
conclude that the budget of f is less than or equal to cWn3 after keywords e1 and e2 are allocated.
The budget of f can only be smaller than cWn3 if f acts as the first-price bidder for both e1
and e2. But this can happen only if the budgets of both d1 and d2 are reduced to an amount less
than or equal to cW/2. For j ∈ {1, 2}, let Sj ⊆ [n] be the set of indices i such that dj acts as the
first-price bidder for i. For both j, we have that∑
i∈Sj
c(wi +W ) ≥ cW2 +
cWn
2
. (3)
Rearranging (3) yields
∑
i∈Sj W ≥W/2+Wn/2−
∑
i∈Sj wi, which implies W |Sj | ≥W/2+Wn/2−
W , and hence |Sj | ≥ n/2 − 1/2. By integrality, then, |Sj | ≥ n/2 for both j. Hence |Sj | = n/2
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for both j, and using (3) again, we have
∑
i∈Sj cwi + cW |Sj | ≥ cW/2 + cWn/2 which implies that∑
i∈Sj wi ≥ W/2 for both j. Therefore, the partition defined by S1 and S2 is a solution to the
PARTITION instance.
To conclude the proof, note that there are cn2+n+2 keywords in the 2PAA(c) instance. Hence,
if the PARTITION instance is a “yes” instance, then by (1), we can run an m/c′-approximation
algorithm to find a second-price matching of value at least cW (n3 + cn2 + n+ 2), and if the PAR-
TITION instance is a “no” instance, then the value of the solution returned by such an algorithm
must be strictly less than cW (n3 + cn2 + n + 2). Hence, an m/c′-approximation algorithm for
2PAA(c) can be used to solve PARTITION.
Theorem 2. Let c ≥ 1 be a constant integer. There is an m/c-approximation to 2PAA(c).
Proof. For each keyword u ∈ U , let su be the second-highest bid for u. Consider the algorithm
that selects the c keywords with the highest values of su and then allocates these keywords to
get su for each of them (i.e., chooses the two highest bidders for u). Since no bidder bids more
than 1/c of its budget for any keyword, no bids are reduced from their original values during this
allocation. Hence, the profit of this allocation is at least (c/m)
∑
u∈U su. Since the value of the
optimal solution cannot be larger than
∑
u∈U su, it follows that this is an m/c-approximation to
2PAA(c).
4 Offline Second-Price Matching
In this section, we turn our attention to the offline version of the special case of Second-Price
Matching (2PM). Before we show our bounds on the approximability of 2PM, we start with a
simple proof that it is NP-hard. Then, in Section 4.1, we show that 2PM is APX-hard, and in
Section 4.2, we give a 2-approximation for 2PM.
Theorem 3. The Second-Price Matching Problem is NP-hard.
Note that this result is subsumed by Theorem 5 below. We present it anyway because it allows us
to illustrate a simpler reduction to the problem.
Proof. We reduce from 3-SAT. Given an instance of 3-SAT in which the variables are X =
{x1, . . . , xn} and the clauses are C = {c1, . . . , ck}, we construct an instance of 2PM as follows:
• For each variable xi ∈ X, there is a keyword vi. We call these keywords the variable keywords.
Each variable keyword vi is connected to two bidders vti and v
f
i . We call these bidders the
assignment bidders.
• For each clause cj ∈ C, there is a keyword uj and a bidder bj . We call these keywords and
bidders clause keywords and clause bidders, respectively. Each clause keyword uj is connected
to bj and three of the assignment bidders, one for each literal ` ∈ cj , chosen as follows. If ` is
of the form xi for some variable xi, then uj is connected to v
f
i . Otherwise, if ` is of the form
xi for some variable xi, then uj is connected to vti .
The keywords arrive in two phases: first the variable keywords and then the clause keywords. An
example of this reduction is illustrated in Figure 3.
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v1
v2
v3
v4
v1t
v1f
v1t
v1f
v2t
v2f
v3t
v3f
u1
u2
b1
b2
Figure 3: An example of the reduction from 3-SAT to 2PM. The formula represented is (x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x4) ∧
(x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4).
We now show that the 2PM instance has a second-price matching of value k + n if and only
if there is a satisfying assignment to the 3-SAT instance. Suppose first that there is a satisfying
assignment to the 3-SAT instance. Let h : X → {t, f} be the satisfying assignment. We construct a
second-price matching as follows. During the first phase, assign each variable keyword vi to v
h(xi)
i .
The profit from this phase is n. During the second phase, assign each clause keyword uj to bj .
Since cj has at least one satisfied literal `, the assignment bidder corresponding to ` will not have
been used in the first phase, and the profit for assigning uj to bj is 1. Thus, the total profit from
this phase is k, and the total profit of the second-price matching is k + n.
On the other hand, if there is a second-price matching of size at least k+n, then since there are
k + n keywords in the 2PMM instance, the profit obtained from each keyword in the second-price
matching must be 1. This means that each variable keyword must have been matched to one of
its assignment bidders during the first phase. Let h : X → {t, f} be the assignment generated
from this matching, i.e., if vi was assigned to v`i (for ` ∈ {t, f}), then let h(xi) = `. Since the
profit obtained from each keyword is 1, each clause keyword uj must have been adjacent to at least
two unused bidders when it was assigned, including one of the assignment bidders, say v`i . Hence,
h(xi) = `, and by construction of the 2PMM instance, clause cj is satisfied by h. We conclude that
h is a satisfying assignment to the 3-SAT instance.
4.1 Hardness of Approximation
To prove that 2PM is APX-hard, we reduce from vertex cover, using the following result.
Theorem 4 (Chleb´ık and Chleb´ıkova´ [CC06]). It is NP-hard to approximate Vertex Cover on
4-regular graphs to within 53/52.
The precise statement of our hardness result is the following theorem.
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Figure 4: The reduction from an instance G of vertex cover (Figure 4(a)) to an instance f(G) of 2PM
(Figure 4(b)).
Theorem 5. It is NP-hard to approximate 2PM to within a factor of 364/363.
Proof. Given a graph G as input to Vertex Cover, we construct an instance f(G) of 2PM as follows.
First, for each edge e ∈ E(G), we create a keyword with the same label (called an edge keyword),
and for each vertex v ∈ V (G), we create a bidder with the same label (called a vertex bidder).
Bidder v bids for keyword e if vertex v is one of the two end points of edge e. (Recall that in 2PM,
if a bidder makes a non-zero bid for a keyword, that bid is 1.) In addition, for each edge e, we
create a unique bidder xe who also bids for e. Furthermore, for each vertex v, we create a gadget
containing two keywords hv and lv and two bidders yv and zv. We let v and yv bid for hv; and yv
and zv bid for lv. The keywords arrive in an order such that for each v ∈ V (G), keyword hv comes
before lv, and the edge keywords arrive after all of the hv’s and lv’s have arrived. An example of
this reduction is shown in Figure 4.
The following lemma provides the basis of the proof.
Lemma 6. Let OPTV C and OPT2P be the size of the minimum vertex cover of G and the maximum
second-price matching on f(G), respectively. Then
OPT2P = 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| −OPTV C
Proof. We first show that given a vertex cover S of size OPTV C of G, we can construct a solution
to the 2PM instance whose value is 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)|−OPTV C . For each vertex v /∈ S, we allocate
hv to v (with yv acting as the second-price bidder) and lv to yv (with zv acting as the second-price
bidder), getting a profit of 2 from the gadget for v. For each vertex v ∈ S, we allocate hv to yv (with
v acting as the second-price bidder) and ignore lv, getting a profit of 1 from the gadget for v. We
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then allocate each edge keyword e to xe. During each of these edge keyword allocations, at least one
of the two vertex bidders that bid for e is still available, since S is a vertex cover. Hence, for each
of these allocations, there is a bidder that can act as a second-price bidder, and the profit from the
allocation is 1. This allocation yields a second-price matching of size 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| −OPTV C .
Therefore, OPT2P ≥ 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| −OPTV C .
To show that OPT2P ≤ 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| − OPTV C , we start with an optimal solution to
f(G) of value OPT2P and construct a vertex cover of G of size 2|V (G)| + |E(G)| − OPT2P . To
do this, we first claim that there exists an optimal solution of f(G) in which every edge-keyword
is allocated for a profit of 1. Consider any optimal second-price matching of the instance. Let e
be an edge-keyword e that is not allocated for a profit of 1. If it is adjacent to a vertex bidder
that is unassigned when e arrives, then e can be allocated to xe for a profit of 1, which can only
increase the value of the solution. Suppose, on the other hand, that both of its vertex bidders are
not available when e arrives. Let v be a vertex bidder that bids for e. Since it is not available,
hv must have been allocated to v. We can transform this second-price matching to another one
in which hv is assigned to yv, lv is ignored and e is assigned to xe, with v acting the second-price
bidder in both cases. This does not decrease the total profit of the solution. Hence, we can perform
these transformations for each edge keyword e that is not allocated for a profit of 1 until we obtain
a new optimal solution in which each edge keyword is allocated for a profit of 1.
Now consider an optimal second-price matching in which all edge keywords are allocated for a
profit of 1. Let T ⊆ V (G) be the set of vertices represented by vertex bidders that are not allocated
any keywords in this second-price matching. Then |T | = 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| − |OPT2P |, and T is a
vertex cover, which implies OPTV C ≤ 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| −OPT2P . The lemma follows.
Now, suppose that we have an α-approximation for 2PM. We will show how to use this approx-
imation algorithm and our reduction to obtain an ((8α− 7)/α)-approximation for Vertex Cover on
4-regular graphs. By Theorem 4, this means that (8α − 7)/α ≥ 53/52, and hence α ≥ 364/363,
unless P = NP .
To construct this ((8α − 7)/α)-approximation algorithm, given a 4-regular graph G, run the
above reduction to obtain a 2PM instance f(G). Then use the α-approximation to obtain a second-
price matching M whose value is at least OPT2P /α. Now, just as in the proof of Lemma 6, we can
assume that in M , every edge keyword e is allocated to xe. Hence, the set of vertices T associated
with the vertex bidders that are not allocated a keyword form a vertex cover, and
|T | ≤ 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| −OPT2P /α
= 2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| − (2|V (G)|+ |E(G)| −OPTV C)/α
= (1− 1/α)(2|V (G)|+ |E(G)|) +OPTV C/α (4)
Since G is 4-regular, we have OPTV C ≥ m/4 = (2|V (G)|+|E(G)|)/8, and hence by (4), we conclude
that |T | ≤ ((8α− 7)/α)OPTV C , which finishes the proof of the theorem.
4.2 A 2-Approximation Algorithm
Consider an instance G = (U ∪ V,E) of the 2PM problem. We provide an algorithm that first
finds a maximum matching f : U → V and then uses f to return a second-price matching that
contains at least half of the keywords matched by f .5 Given a matching f , call an edge (u, v) ∈ E
5Note that f is a partial function.
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such that f(u) 6= v an up-edge if v is matched by f and f−1(v) arrives before u, and a down-edge
otherwise. Recall that we have assumed without loss of generality that the degree of every keyword
in U is at least two. Therefore, every keyword u ∈ U that is matched by f must have at least one
up-edge or down-edge. Theorem 7 shows that the following algorithm, called ReverseMatch, is a
2-approximation for 2PM.
ReverseMatch Algorithm:
Initialization:
Find an arbitrary maximum matching f : U → V on G.
Constructing a 2nd-price matching:
Consider the matched keywords in reverse order of their arrival.
For each keyword u:
If keyword u is adjacent to a down-edge (u, v):
Assign keyword u to bidder f(u) (with v acting as the second-price bidder).
Else:
Choose an arbitrary bidder v that is adjacent to keyword u.
Remove the edge (f−1(v), v) from f .
Assign keyword u to bidder f(u) (with v acting as the second-price bidder).
Theorem 7. The ReverseMatch algorithm is a 2-approximation.
Proof. Since the number of vertices matched by f is an upper bound on the profit of the maximum
second-price matching on G, we need only to prove that the second-price matching contains at least
half of the keywords matched by f . By the behavior of the algorithm, it is clear that whenever a
vertex u is matched to f(u) in the second-price matching, the profit obtained is 1. Furthermore,
every time an an edge is removed from f , a new keyword is added to the second-price matching.
Thus, the theorem follows.
5 Online Second-Price Matching
In this section, we consider the online 2PM problem, in which the keywords arrive one-by-one and
must be matched by the algorithm as they arrive. We start, in Section 5.1, by giving a simple
lower bound showing that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than
m, the number of keywords. Then we move to randomized online algorithms and show that no
randomized algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than 2. In Section 5.2, we provide a
randomized online algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of 2
√
e/(
√
e− 1) ≈ 5.083.
5.1 Lower Bounds
The following theorem establishes our lower bound on deterministic algorithms, which matches the
trivial algorithm of arbitrarily allocating the first keyword to arrive, and refusing to allocate any
of the remaining keywords.
Theorem 8. For any m, there is an adversary that creates a graph with m keywords that forces
any deterministic algorithm to get a competitive ratio no better than m.
Proof. The adversary shows the algorithm a single keyword (keyword 1) that has two adjacent
bidders, a1 and b2. If the algorithm does not match keyword 1 at all, a new keyword 2 arrives
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that is adjacent to two new bidders a2 and b2. The adversary continues in this way until either
m keywords arrive or the algorithm matches a keyword k < m. In the first case, the algorithm’s
performance is at most 1 (because it might match keyword m), whereas the adversary can match
all m keywords. Hence, the ratio is at least m.
In the second case, the adversary continues as follows. Suppose without loss of generality that
the algorithm matches keyword k to ak. Then each keyword i, for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ m, has one edge
to ak and one edge to a new bidder ci. Since the algorithm cannot match any of these keywords
for a profit, its performance is 1. The adversary can clearly match each keyword i for profit, for
1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, and if it matches keyword k to bk, then it can use ak as a second-price bidder for the
remaining keywords to match them all to the ci’s for profit. Hence, the adversary can construct a
second-price matching of size at least m.
We next show that no online (randomized) online algorithm for 2PM can achieve a competitive
ratio better than 2.
Theorem 9. The competitive ratio of any randomized algorithm for 2PM must be at least 2.
Proof. We invoke Yao’s Principle [Yao77] and construct a distribution of inputs for which the best
deterministic algorithm achieves an expected performance of (asymptotically) 1/2 the value of the
optimal solution.
Our distribution is constructed as follows. The first keyword arrives, and it is adjacent to two
bidders. Then the second keyword arrives, and it is adjacent to one of the two bidders adjacent
to the first keyword, chosen uniformly at random, as well as a new bidder; then the third keyword
arrives, and it is adjacent to one of the bidders adjacent to the second keyword, chosen uniformly at
random, as well as a new bidder; and so on, until the m-th keyword arrives. We call this a normal
instance. To analyze the performance of the online algorithms, we also define a restricted instance
to be one that is exactly the same as a normal instance except that one of the two bidders of the
first keyword is marked unavailable, i.e., he can not participate in any auction.
Clearly, an offline algorithm that knows the random choices beforehand can allocate each key-
word to the bidder that will not be adjacent to the keyword that arrives next. In this way, it can
ensure that for each keyword, there is a bidder that can act as a second-price bidder. Hence for a
normal instance, the optimal second-price matching obtains a profit of m.
Consider the algorithm Greedy, which allocates a keyword to an arbitrary adjacent bidder if
and only if there is another available bidder to act as a second-price bidder. Our proof consists
of two steps: first, we will show that the expected performance of Greedy on the normal instance
is (m + 1)/2, and second we will prove that Greedy is the best algorithm in expectation for both
types of instances.
Let X∗k and Y
∗
k be the expected profit of Greedy on a normal and a restricted instance of k
keywords, respectively (where X∗0 and Y ∗0 are both defined to be 0). Given the first keyword of a
normal instance, Greedy allocates it to an arbitrary bidder. Then, with probability 1/2, it is faced
with a normal instance of k − 1 keywords, and with probability 1/2, it is faced with a restricted
instance of k − 1 keywords. Therefore, for all integers k ≥ 1,
X∗k = 1/2(X
∗
k−1 + Y
∗
k−1) + 1 . (5)
On the other hand, given the first keyword of a restricted instance, Greedy just waits for the
second keyword. Then, with probability 1/2, the second keyword chooses the marked bidder, giving
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Greedy a restricted instance of k−1 keywords, and with probability 1/2, the second keyword chooses
the unmarked bidder, giving Greedy a normal instance of k − 1 keywords. Therefore, for all k,
Y ∗k = 1/2(X
∗
k−1 + Y
∗
k−1) . (6)
From (5) and (6) we have, for all k,
Y ∗k = X
∗
k − 1 . (7)
Plugging (7) for k = m− 1 into (5) for k = m yields
X∗m = X
∗
m−1 + 1/2 , (8)
and hence, by induction X∗m = (m+ 1)/2.
Now, we prove that Greedy is the best among all algorithms on these two types of instances.
In fact, we make it easier for the algorithms by telling them beforehand how many keywords in
the instance they will need to solve. Let Xm and Ym be the expected number of keywords in the
second-price matching produced by the best algorithms that “know” that they are solving a normal
instance of size m and a restricted instance of size m, respectively. Let Am and Bm denote these
optimal algorithms.
We prove that Xm ≤ X∗m and Ym ≤ Y ∗m for all m by induction. The base case in which m = 1 is
easy, since no algorithm can obtain a profit of more than one on a normal instance of one keyword
or more than zero on a restricted instance of one keyword. We now prove the induction step.
First, consider Am. When the first keyword arrives, Am has two choices: either ignore it or
allocate it to one of the bidders. If Am ignores the first keyword, its performance is at most the
performance of Am−1 on the remaining keywords, which constitute a normal instance of m − 1
keywords. On the other hand, if Am allocates the first keyword to one of the bidders, then with
probability 1/2, it is faced with a normal instance of m− 1 keywords, and with probability 1/2 it
is faced with a restricted instance of m− 1 keywords. The performance of Am on these instance is
at most the performance of Am−1 and Bm−1, respectively. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (7),
and (8), we have
Xm ≤ max{Xm−1, 1/2(Xm−1 + Ym−1) + 1}
≤ max{X∗m−1, 1/2(X∗m−1 + Y ∗m−1) + 1}
= max{X∗m−1, 1/2(X∗m−1 +X∗m−1 − 1) + 1}
= X∗m−1 + 1/2
= X∗m .
Next, consider Bm. When the first keyword arrives, Bm cannot allocate it for a profit. If it
allocates it for a profit of 0, then it is faced with a restricted instance of m− 1 keywords. If it does
not allocate the keyword, then with probability 1/2, Bm is faced with a normal instance of m− 1
keywords, and with probability 1/2, it is faced with a restricted instance of m − 1 keywords. Its
performance on these instances is at most those of Am−1 and Bm−1, respectively. Thus, by the
induction hypothesis and (6), we have
Ym ≤ max{Ym−1, 1/2(Xm−1 + Ym−1)}
≤ max{Y ∗m−1, 1/2(X∗m−1 + Y ∗m−1)}
= Y ∗m .
This completes the proof.
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5.2 A Randomized Competitive Algorithm
In this section, we provide an algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio of 2
√
e/(
√
e−1) ≈ 5.083.
The result builds on a new generalization of the result that the Ranking algorithm for online
bipartite matching achieves a competitive ratio of e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.582. This was originally shown
by Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani [KVV90], though a mistake was recently found in their proof by
Krohn and Varadarajan and corrected by Goel and Mehta [GM08].
The online bipartite matching problem is merely the first-price version of 2PM, i.e., the problem
in which there is no requirement for there to exist a second-price bidder to get a profit of 1 for a
match. The Ranking algorithm chooses a random permutation on the bidders V and uses that to
choose matches for the keywords U as they arrive. This is described more precisely below.
Ranking Algorithm:
Initialization:
Choose a random permutation (ranking) σ of the bidders V .
Online Matching :
Upon arrival of keyword u ∈ U :
Let N(u) be the set of neighbors of u that have not been matched yet.
If N(u) 6= ∅, match u to the bidder v ∈ N(u) that minimizes σ(v).
Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani, and Goel and Mehta prove the following result.
Theorem 10 (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani [KVV90] and Goel and Mehta [GM08]). The Ranking
algorithm for online bipartite matching achieves a competitive ratio of e/(e− 1) + o(1).
In order to state our generalization of this result, we define the notion of a left k-copy of a bipartite
graph G = (U ∪ V,E). Intuitively, a left k-copy of G makes k copies of each keyword u ∈ U such
that the neighborhood of a copy of u is the same as the neighborhood of u. More precisely, we have
the following definition.
Definition 11. Given a bipartite graph G = (UG ∪ V,EG), a left k-copy of G is a graph H =
(UH ∪ V,EH) for which |UH | = k|UG| and for which there exists a map ζ : UH → UG such that
• for each uG ∈ UG there are exactly k vertices uH ∈ UH such that ζ(uH) = uG, and
• for all uH ∈ UH and v ∈ V , (uH , v) ∈ EH if and only if (ζ(uH), v) ∈ EG.
Our generalization of Theorem 10 describes the competitive ratio of Ranking on a graph H that is
a left k-copy of G. Its proof, presented in Appendix B, builds on the proof of Theorem 10 presented
by Birnbaum and Mathieu [BM08].
Theorem 12. Let G = (UG ∪ V,EG) be a bipartite graph that has a maximum matching of size
OPT1P , and let H = (UH ∪ V,EH) be a left k-copy of G. Then the expected size of the matching
returned by Ranking on H is at least
kOPT1P
(
1− 1
e1/k
+ o(1)
)
.
Using this result, we are able to prove that the following algorithm, called RankingSimulate, achieves
a competitive ratio of 2
√
e/(
√
e− 1).
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RankingSimulate Algorithm:
Initialization:
Set M , the set of matched bidders, to ∅.
Set R, the set of reserved bidders, to ∅.
Choose a random permutation (ranking) σ of the bidders V .
Online Matching:
Upon arrival of keyword u ∈ U :
Let N(u) be the set of neighbors of u that are not in M or R.
If N(u) = ∅, do nothing.
If |N(u)| = 1, let v be the single bidder in N(u).
With probability 1/2, match u to v and add v to M , and
With probability 1/2, add v to R.
If |N(u)| ≥ 2, let v1 and v2 be the two distinct bidders in N(u) that minimize σ(v).
With probability 1/2, match u to v1, add v1 to M , and add v2 to R, and
With probability 1/2, match u to v2, add v1 to R, and add v2 to M .
Let G = (UG ∪V,EG) be the bipartite input graph to 2PM, and let H = (UH ∪V,EH) be a left
2-copy of H. In the arrival order for H, the two copies of each keyword uG ∈ U arrive in sequential
order. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Fix a ranking σ on V . For each bidder v ∈ V , let Xv be the indicator variable for
the event that v is matched by Ranking on H, when the ranking is σ.6 Let X ′v be the indicator
variable for the event that v is matched by RankingSimulate on G, when the ranking is σ. Then
E(X ′v) = Xv/2.
Proof. It is easy to establish the invariant that for all v ∈ V , Xv = 1 if and only if RankingSimulate
puts v in either M or R. Furthermore, each bidder v ∈ V is put in M or R at most once by
RankingSimulate. The lemma follows because each time RankingSimulate adds a bidder v to M
or R, it matches it with probability 1/2.
With Theorem 12 and Lemma 13, we can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 14. The competitive ratio of RankingSimulate is 2
√
e/(
√
e− 1) ≈ 5.083.
Proof. For a permutation σ on V , let RankingSimulate(σ) be the matching of G returned by
RankingSimulate, and let Ranking(σ) be the matching of H returned by Ranking. Lemma 13
implies that, conditioned on σ, E(|RankingSimulate(σ)|) = |Ranking(σ)|/2. By Theorem 12,
E(|RankingSimulate(σ)|) = 1
2
E(|Ranking(σ)|) ≥ OPT1P
(
1− 1/e1/2 + o(1)
)
.
Fix a bidder v ∈ V . Let Pv be the profit from v obtained by RankingSimulate. Suppose that
v is matched by RankingSimulate to keyword u ∈ UG. Recall that we have assumed without loss
of generality that the degree of u is at least 2. Let v′ 6= v be another bidder adjacent to u. Then,
given that v is matched to u, the probability that v′ is matched to any keyword is no greater than
1/2. Therefore, E(Pv|v matched) ≥ 1/2. Hence, the expected value of the second-price matching
6Note that once σ is fixed, Xv is deterministic.
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returned by RankingSimulate is∑
v∈V
E(Pv) =
∑
v∈V
E(Pv|v matched)Pr(v matched)
≥ 1
2
∑
v∈V
Pr(v matched)
=
1
2
E(|RankingSimulate(σ)|)
≥ 1
2
OPT1P
(
1− 1/e1/2 + o(1)
)
≥ 1
2
OPT2P
(
1− 1/e1/2 + o(1)
)
,
where OPT2P is the size of the optimal second-price matching on G.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite
different from that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem, and that this discrepancy
extends to the special case of 2PM, whose first-price analogue is bipartite matching. On the positive
side, we have given a 2-approximation for offline 2PM and a 5.083-competitive algorithm for online
2PM.
Some open questions remain. Closing the gap between 2 and 364/363 in the approximability of
offline 2PM is one clear direction for future research, as is closing the gap between 2 and 5.083 in
the competitive ratio for online 2PM. Another question we leave open is whether the analysis for
RankingSimulate is tight, though we expect that it is not.
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A Discussion of Related Models
In this section, we discuss the relationship between the “strict” and “non-strict” models of Goel et
al. [GMNS08] and our model. In the strict model, a bidder’s bid can be above his remaining budget,
as long as the remaining budget is strictly positive. In the non-strict model, bidders can keep their
bids positive even after their budget is depleted. In both models a bidder is not charged more than
his remaining budget for a slot. Therefore, in the non-strict model, if a bidder is allocated a slot
after his budget is fully depleted, then he gets the slot for free.
Given an instance A, let OPT2P be the optimal solution value in our model; let OPTstrict be
the optimal solution value under the strict model; and let OPTnon−strict be the optimal solution
value under the non-strict model. Surprisingly, even though the strict and non-strict models seem
more permissive, it is possible for OPT2P to be Ω(m) times as big as OPTstrict and OPTnon−strict,
even when Rmin is a large constant c. This is shown in Figure 5.
On the other hand, we show below that the optimal values of the two models of Goel et al.
cannot be better than the optimal value of our model by more than a constant factor.
Theorem 15. For any instance A, OPTnon−strict ≤ (2+1/Rmin)OPTstrict ≤ 8(2+1/Rmin)OPT2P .
The first inequality is proved by Goel et al. [GMNS08], so we must only prove that OPTstrict ≤
8OPT2P .
The core of our argument is a reduction from 2PAA to the First-Price Ad Auctions problem
(1PAA),7 in which only one bidder is chosen for each keyword and that bidder pays the minimum
of its bid and its remaining budget. Given an instance A of 2PAA, we construct an instance A′ of
1PAA problem by replacing each bid bu,v by
b′u,v , max
v′ 6=v : bu,v′≤bu,v
bu,v′ .
7Recall that this problem has also been called the Adwords problem [MSVV07] and the Maximum Budgeted
Allocation problem [ABK+08, CG08, Sri08].
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Figure 5: In this example, Rmin is equal to a constant c, i.e., every bid is at most 1/c of the budget of the
bidder. In the strict model, all keywords except the first must be allocated to the second bidder at a price
of k (or the remaining budget if it’s smaller). Thus, the total profit on this input for the strict model is at
most ck + 3. On the other hand, in our model, if we allocate the first keyword to the second bidder, and
then the next c− 1 keywords to the second bidder, that bidder’s budget is reduced to k− 1. Thus, all of the
remaining keywords can be allocated to the lower bidder at a price of k − 1, for a total revenue exceeding
ck(k − 1). For k large, this ratio is Ω(k) = Ω(m).
Denote by OPT1P (A′) the optimal value of the first-price model on A′. The following two lemmas
prove Theorem 15 by relating both OPTnon−strict(A) and OPT2P (A) to OPT1P (A′).
Lemma 16. OPTnon−strict(A) ≤ OPT1P (A′).
Proof. For an instance A, we can view a non-strict second-price allocation of A as a pair of (partial)
functions f1 and f2 from the keywords U to the bidders V , where f1 maps each keyword to the
bidder to which it is allocated and f2 maps each keyword to the bidder acting as its second-price
bidder. Thus, if f1(u) = v and f2(u) = v′ then u is allocated to v and the price v pays is bu,v′ . We
have, for all such u, v, and v′, that bu,v′ ≤ b′u,v.
We construct the first-price allocation on A′ defined by f1 and claim that the value of this
first-price allocation is at least the value of the non-strict allocation defined by f1 and f2. It suffices
to show that for any bidder v, the profit that the non-strict allocation gets from v is at most the
profit that the first-price allocation gets from v, or in other words,
min
Bv, ∑
u:f1(u)=v
bu,f2(u)
 ≤ min
Bv, ∑
u:f1(u)=v
b′u,v
 .
This inequality follows trivially from the fact that bu,f2(u) ≤ b′u,f1(u) for all allocated keywords u,
and hence the lemma follows.
Lemma 17. OPT1P (A′) ≤ 8OPT2P (A).
19
Proof. Given an optimal first-price allocation of A′, we can assume without loss of generality that
each bidder’s budget can only be exhausted by the last keyword allocated to it, or, more formally,
if u1, u2, . . . uk are the keywords that are allocated to a bidder v and they come in that order, then
we can assume that
∑k−1
i=1 b
′
ui,v < Bv. The reason for this is that if for some j < k,
∑j−1
i=1 b
′
ui,v < Bv
and
∑j
i=1 b
′
ui,v ≥ Bv, then we can ignore the allocation of uj+1, . . . uk to v without losing any profit.
With this assumption, we design a randomized algorithm that constructs a second-price allo-
cation on A whose expected value in our model is at least 1/8 of the first-price allocation’s value.
Viewing the first-price allocation of A′ as a (partial) function f from the keywords U to the bidders
V and denoting by s(u, v) the bidder v′ for which bv′u = b′vu, the algorithm is as follows.
Random Construction:
Randomly mark each bidder with probability 1/2.
For each unmarked bidder v:
Let Sv = ∅.
For each keyword u such that f(u) = v:
If s(u, v) is marked: Sv = Sv ∪ {u}.
Assume that Sv = {u1, u2, . . . uk}, where u1, u2, . . . uk come in that order.
If
∑k
i=1 b
′
ui,v ≤ Bv:
Let f1(ui) = v and f2(ui) = s(ui, v) for all i ≤ k.
Else:
If
∑k−1
i=1 b
′
ui,v ≥ b′uk,v: let f1(ui) = v and f2(ui) = s(ui, v) for all i ≤ k − 1.
Else: let f1(uk) = v and f2(uk) = s(uk, v).
We claim that for the f1 and f2 defined by this construction, whenever f(ui) is set to v, the
profit from that allocation is b′ui,v. This is not trivial because in our model, if a bidder’s remaining
budget is smaller than its bid for a keyword, it changes its bid for that keyword to its remaining
budget. However, one can easily verify that in all cases, if we set f1(ui) = v and f2(ui) = s(ui, v),
the remaining budget of v is at least b′ui,v = bui,s(ui,v). Thus, the (modified) bid of f1(ui) for ui is
still at least the original bid of f2(ui) for ui.
We claim that the expected value of the second-price allocation defined by f1 and f2 is at least
1/8OPT1P (A′). For each bidder v, let Xv be the random variable denoting the profit that f1 and
f2 get from v, and let Yv be the profit that f gets from v. We have OPT1P (A′) =
∑
v Yv, so it
suffices to show that E(Xv) ≥ 1/8Yv for all v ∈ V .
Consider any v ∈ V that is unmarked. Let Tv = {u : f(u) = v}. If
∑
u∈Sv b
′
u,v ≤ Bv then
Xv =
∑
u∈Sv b
′
u,v. If
∑
u∈Sv b
′
u,v > Bv then Xv ≥
∑
u∈Sv b
′
u,v/2. Thus, in both case, we have
E[Xv|v is unmarked] ≥ E[
∑
u∈Sv
b′u,v/2|v is unmarked] =
∑
u∈Tv
b′u,v/4 = Yv/4 ,
which implies
E[Xv] ≥ E[Xv|v is unmarked]Pr[v is unmarked] = 1/2 · Yv/4 = Yv/8 .
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B Proof of Theorem 12
In this appendix, we provide a full proof of Theorem 12. The proof presented here is quite similar
to the simplified proof of Theorem 10 presented by Birnbaum and Mathieu [BM08]. For intuition
into the proof presented here, the interested reader is referred to that work.8
Let G = (UG∪V,EG) be a bipartite graph and let H = (UH ∪V,EH) be a left k-copy of G. Let
ζ : UH → UG be a map that satisfies the conditions of Definition 11. Let MG ⊆ EG be a maximum
matching of G.
Let Ranking(H,pi, σ) denote the matching constructed on H for arrival order pi, when the
ranking is σ. Consider another process in which the vertices in V arrive in the order given by σ and
are matched to the available vertex u ∈ UH that minimizes pi(u). Call the matching constructed
by this process Ranking′(H,pi, σ). It is not hard to see that these matchings are identical, a fact
that is proved in [KVV90].
Lemma 18 (Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani [KVV90]). For any permutations pi and σ, Ranking(H,pi, σ) =
Ranking′(H,pi, σ).
The following monotonicity lemma shows that removing vertices in H can only decrease the
size of the matching returned by Ranking.
Lemma 19. Let piH be an arrival order for the vertices in UH , and let σH be a ranking on the
vertices in V . Suppose that x is a vertex in UH ∪ V , and let H ′ = (UH′ , VH′ , EH′) = H \ {x}.
Let piH′ and σH′ be the orderings of UH′ and VH′ induced by piH and σH , respectively. Then
|Ranking(H ′, piH′ , σH′)| ≤ |Ranking(H,piH , σH)|.
Proof. Suppose first that x ∈ UH . In this case, V = VH′ and σH = σH′ . Let Qt(H) ⊆ V
be the set of vertices matched to vertices in UH that arrive at or before time t (under arrival
order piH and ranking σH), and let Qt(H ′) ⊆ V be the set of vertices matched to vertices in
UH′ that arrive at or before time t (under arrival order piH′ and ranking σH). We prove by
induction on t that Qt−1(H ′) ⊆ Qt(H), which by substituting t = n is sufficient to prove the
claim. The statement holds when t = 1, since Q0(H ′) = ∅. Now supposing we have Qt−2(H ′) ⊆
Qt−1(H), we prove Qt−1(H ′) ⊆ Qt(H). Suppose that t is at or before the time that x arrives
in piH . Then clearly Qt−1(H ′) = Qt−1(H) ⊆ Qt(H). Now suppose that t is after the time that
x arrives in piH . Let u be the vertex that arrives at time t − 1 in piH′ . If u is not matched by
Ranking(H ′, piH′ , σH), then Qt−1(H ′) = Qt−2(H ′) ⊆ Qt−1(H) ⊆ Qt(H). Now suppose that u
is matched by Ranking(H ′, piH′ , σH), say to vertex v′. We show that v′ ∈ Qt(H), which by the
induction hypothesis, is enough to prove that Qt−1(H ′) ⊆ Qt(H). Note that u arrives at time
t in piH . Let v be the vertex to which u is matched by Ranking(H,piH , σH). If v = v′, we are
done, so suppose that v 6= v′. Since v 6∈ Qt−1(H), it follows by the induction hypothesis that
v 6∈ Qt−2(H ′). Therefore, vertex v is available to be matched to u when it arrives in piH′ . Since
Ranking(H ′, piH′ , σH) matched u to v′ instead, v′ must have a lower rank than v in σH . Since
Ranking(H,piH , σH) chose v, vertex v′ must have already been matched when vertex u arrived at
time t in piH , or, in other words, v′ ∈ Qt−1(H) ⊆ Qt(H).
8For those familiar with the proof in [BM08], the main difference between the proof of Theorem 12 presented here
and the proof of Theorem 10 presented in [BM08] appears in Lemma 23. Instead of letting u be the single vertex
that is matched to v by the perfect matching, as is done in [BM08], we choose u uniformly at random from one of
the k vertices that correspond to the vertex that is matched to v by the perfect matching. The rest of the proof is
essentially the same, but we present its entirety here for completeness.
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Now suppose that x ∈ V . In this case, UH = UH′ and piH = piH′ . Let Rt(H) ⊆ UH be the set
of vertices matched to vertices in V that are ranked less than or equal to t (under arrival order
piH and ranking σH), and let Rt(H ′) ⊆ UH be the set of vertices matched to vertices in V that
are ranked less than or equal to t (under arrival order piH and ranking σH′). Then by Lemma 18,
we can apply the same argument as before to show that Rt−1(H ′) ⊆ Rt(H) for all t, which by
substituting t = n, is sufficient to prove the claim.
We define the following notation. For all uG ∈ UG, let ζ−1(uG) be the set of all uH ∈ UH such
that ζ(uH) = uG, and for any subset U ′G ⊆ UG, let ζ−1(U ′G) be the set of all uH ∈ UH such that
ζ(uH) ∈ U ′G. The following lemma shows that we can assume without loss of generality that MG
is a perfect matching.
Lemma 20. Let U ′ ⊆ UG and V ′ ⊆ V be the subset of vertices that are in MG. Let G′ be the
subgraph of G induced by U ′ ∪ V ′, and let H ′ be the subgraph of H induced by ζ−1(U ′) ∪ V ′. Then
the expected size of the matching produced by Ranking on H ′ is no greater than the expected size of
the matching produced by Ranking on H.
Proof. The proof follows by repeated application of Lemma 19 for all x that are not in ζ−1(U ′) ∪
V ′.
In light of Lemma 20, to prove Theorem 12, it is sufficient to show that the expected size of
the matching produced by Ranking on H ′ is at least (1− 1/e1/k− o(1))|MG|. To simplify notation,
we instead assume without loss of generality that G = G′, and hence G has a perfect matching.
Let n = OPT1P = |MG| = |V |. Henceforth, fix an arrival order pi. To simplify notation, we write
Ranking(σ) to mean Ranking(H,pi, σ).
Let f : UH → V be a map such that for all v ∈ V , there are exactly k vertices u ∈ UH such
that f(u) = v. The existence of such a map f follows from the assumption that G has a perfect
matching. For any vertex v ∈ V let f−1(v) be the set of u ∈ UH such that f(u) = v. We proceed
with the following two lemmas.
Lemma 21. Let u ∈ UH , and let v = f(u). For any ranking σ, if v is not matched by Ranking(σ),
then u is matched to a vertex whose rank is less than the rank of v in σ.
Proof. If v is not matched by Ranking(σ), then since there is an edge between u and v, it was
available to be matched to u when it arrived. Therefore, by the behavior of Ranking, u must have
been matched to a vertex of lower rank.
Lemma 22. Let u ∈ UH , and let v = f(u). Fix an integer t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Let σ be a
permutation, and let σ′ be the permutation obtained from σ by removing vertex v and putting it
back in so its rank is t. If v is not matched by Ranking(σ′), then u must be matched by Ranking(σ)
to a vertex whose rank in σ is less than or equal to t.
Proof. For the proof, it is convenient to invoke Lemma 18 and consider Ranking′(σ) and Ranking′(σ′)
instead of Ranking(σ) and Ranking(σ′). In the process by which Ranking′ constructs its matching,
call the moment that the tth vertex in V arrives time t. For any 1 ≤ s ≤ n, let Rs(σ) (resp., Rs(σ′))
be the set of vertices in UH matched by time s in σ (resp., σ′). By Lemma 21, if v is not matched
by Ranking(σ′), then u must be matched to a vertex v′ in Ranking(σ′) such that σ′(v′) < σ′(v).
Hence u ∈ Rt−1(σ′). We prove the lemma by showing that Rt−1(σ′) ⊆ Rt(σ). Let t˜ be the time
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that v arrives in σ. Then if t˜ ≥ t, the two orders σ and σ are identical through time t, which implies
that Rt−1(σ′) = Rt−1(σ) ⊆ Rt(σ).
Now, in the case that t˜ < t, we prove that for 1 ≤ s ≤ t, Rs−1(σ′) ⊆ Rs(σ). The proof, which is
similar to the proof of Lemma 19, proceeds by induction on s. When s = 0, the claim clearly holds,
since R0(σ′) = ∅. Now, supposing that Rs−2(σ′) ⊆ Rs−1(σ), we prove that Rs−1(σ′) ⊆ Rs(σ). If
s ≤ t˜, then the two orders σ and σ′ are identical through time s, so Rs−1(σ′) = Rs−1(σ) ⊆ Rs(σ).
Now suppose that s > t˜. Then the vertex that arrives at time s − 1 in σ′ is the same as the
vertex that arrives at time s in σ. Call this vertex w. If w is not matched by Ranking′(σ′), then
Rs−1(σ′) = Rs−2(σ′), and we are done by the induction hypothesis. Now suppose that w is matched
to vertex x′ by Ranking′(σ′) and to vertex x by Ranking′(σ). If x = x′, then again we are done
by the induction hypothesis, so suppose that x 6= x′. Since x was available at time s − 1 in σ, we
have x 6∈ Rs−1(σ), and by the induction hypothesis x 6∈ Rs−2(σ′). Hence, x was available at time
s − 1 in σ′. Since Ranking′(σ′) matched w to x′, it must be that pi(x′) < pi(x). This implies that
x′ must be matched when w arrives at time s in σ, or in other words, x′ ∈ Rs−1(σ) ⊆ Rs(σ). By
the induction hypothesis, we are done.
Lemma 23. For 1 ≤ t ≤ n, let xt denote the probability over σ that the vertex ranked t in V is
matched by Ranking(σ). Then
1− xt ≤ 1
kn
t∑
s=1
xs . (9)
Proof. Let σ be permutation chosen uniformly at random, and let σ′ be a permutation obtained
from σ by choosing a vertex v ∈ V uniformly at random, taking it out of σ, and putting it back
so that its rank is t. Note that both σ and σ′ are distributed uniformly at random among all
permutations. Let u be a vertex chosen uniformly at random from f−1(v). Note that conditioned
on σ, u is equally likely to be any of the kn vertices in UH . Let Rt be the set of vertices in UH
that are matched by Ranking(σ) to a vertex of rank t or lower in σ. Lemma 22 states that if v
is not matched by Ranking(σ′), then u ∈ Rt. The expected size of Rt is
∑
1≤s≤t xs. Hence, the
probability that u ∈ Rt, conditioned on σ, is (1/(kn))
∑
1≤s≤t xs. The lemma follows because the
probability that v is not matched by Ranking(σ′) is 1− xt.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 12.
Proof of Theorem 12. For 0 ≤ t ≤ n, let St =
∑
1≤s≤t xs. Then the expected size of the matching
returned by Ranking on H is Sn. Rearranging (9) yields, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
St ≥
(
kn
kn+ 1
)
(1 + St−1) ,
which by induction implies that St ≥
∑
1≤s≤t(kn/(kn+ 1))
s, and hence
Sn ≥
n∑
s=1
(
kn
kn+ 1
)s
= kn
(
1−
(
1− 1
kn+ 1
)n)
= kn
(
1− 1
e1/k
+ o(1)
)
.
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